Localness in climate change by Shepherd, T. G. & Sobel, A. H.
Prediction and uncertainty 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Shepherd, T. G. and Sobel, A. H. (2019) Prediction and 
uncertainty. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East. ISSN 1548­226X (In Press) Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/85548/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Publisher: Duke University Press 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
 1	
CSSAAME, forthcoming 
Prediction	and	Uncertainty	Theodore	G.	Shepherd	and	Adam	H.	Sobel	
Abstract	Climate	change	is	a	global	problem,	yet	is	experienced	at	the	local	scale,	in	ways	that	are	both	place-specific	and	specific	to	the	accidents	of	weather	history.	This	article	takes	the	dichotomy	between	the	global	and	the	local	as	a	starting	point	to	develop	a	critique	of	the	normative	approach	within	climate	science,	which	is	global	in	various	ways	and	thereby	fails	to	bring	meaning	to	the	local.		The	article	discusses	the	ethical	choices	implicit	in	the	current	paradigm	of	climate	prediction,	how	irreducible	uncertainty	at	the	local	scale	can	be	managed	by	suitable	reframing	of	the	scientific	questions,	and	some	particular	epistemic	considerations	that	apply	to	climate	change	in	the	global	south.	The	article	argues	for	an	elevation	of	the	narrative,	and	for	a	demotion	of	the	probabilistic	from	its	place	of	privilege	in	the	construction	and	communication	of	our	understanding	of	global	warming	and	its	local	consequences.		Keywords:	climate	change;	climate	ethics;	uncertainty;	narrative	3	June	2019	
Introduction	In	The	Great	Derangement,	the	novelist	and	anthropologist	Amitav	Ghosh	asks	why	we	find	it	so	difficult	to	think	about	climate	change.	The	question	starts	with	literature	but	then	extends	to	history	and	politics.	His	answer	is	that	in	all	three	arenas,	the	modern	mindset	has	promoted	the	primacy	of	human,	indeed	individual,	agency.	In	this	mindset,	there	is	no	place	for	the	uncanny	–	and	climate	change,	especially	at	the	local	scale,	is	nothing	if	not	uncanny.	Not	only	does	climate	change	require	a	rather	different	conception	of	agency,	it	also	asks	us	to	consider	the	geography	of	climate	change	as	both	uneven	and	unequal.	For	instance,	the	cities	established	through	colonialism	have	been	largely	sited	on	coasts,	in	defiance	of	threats	from	tropical	cyclones	and	coastal	flooding,	indeed	often	on	landfill.	The	localization	of	climate	change	is	perhaps	most	salient	in	these	vulnerable	and	exposed	places.	Yet	climate	science	takes	the	scale	of	the	global	as	normative	and	the	local	as	accidental.	It	thereby	‘detaches	knowledge	from	meaning’1,	and	enacts	forms	of	what	the	philosopher	Miranda	Fricker	has	called	‘hermeneutic	injustice.’2		We	describe	here	some	ideas	emerging	from	within	climate	science,	informed	by	other	disciplines,	which	express	this	critique	and	aim	to	address	it.	
1.	The	Scale	of	the	Global	Global	warming	is,	as	the	phrase	says,	global.	Though	the	rate	of	human-induced	temperature	increase	is	not	uniform	in	magnitude	–	most	dramatically,	the	Arctic	is	warming	faster	than	elsewhere	–	nearly	everywhere	on	earth	is	warming.	And	the	
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responsible	increases	in	greenhouse	gas	concentrations,	even	more	so	than	temperature,	are	truly	global.	Carbon	dioxide	is	long-lived	and	well-mixed	in	the	atmosphere,	with	a	nearly	uniform	concentration,	so	a	ton	of	CO2	emitted	anywhere	is	the	same	as	a	ton	emitted	anywhere	else.	Its	global	scale	is	one	of	the	aspects	that	makes	climate	change	such	a	daunting	challenge	for	the	human	species.	Our	confidence	in	the	basic	fact	of	a	substantial	human	influence	on	climate	rests	in	large	part	on	our	solid	understanding	of	the	greenhouse	effect	and	its	thermodynamic	consequences	–	that	is,	it	directly	increases	temperature,	and	almost	as	directly	increases	atmospheric	moisture	and	raises	sea	level	–	which	act,	fundamentally,	at	the	global	scale.		Yet	the	impacts	of	the	warming	will	be	felt	at	the	local	scale,	and	will	differ	according	to	all	the	particularities	of	place,	both	physical	and	human:	geographic,	social,	political,	economic,	and	cultural.	The	models	used	to	make	climate	predictions	have	spatial	resolutions	on	the	order	of	100	km.	Resolution	in	these	models	is	analogous	to	the	resolution,	or	pixel	size,	in	a	digital	camera	image;	nothing	of	this	size	or	smaller	can	be	represented.	Yet	a	typical	city,	for	example,	is	much	smaller	than	this.	Methods	have	been	developed	to	‘downscale’	climate	predictions,	but	these	tend	to	magnify	uncertainties,	which	were	already	substantial	at	larger	scales.3	Thus	the	need	to	understand	global	warming’s	impacts	on	human	society,	and	to	adapt	in	order	to	reduce	the	harm	it	does,	puts	pressure	on	climate	science	to	produce	predictions	at	spatial	scales	much	smaller	than	those	at	which	it	has	historically	been	able	to	do	so	with	any	confidence.		In	addition	to	being	global	in	physical	space,	the	dominant	mode	of	doing	and	communicating	climate	science	is	also	global	in	another,	more	conceptual	sense:	namely,	it	is	global	in	the	space	of	possible	trajectories,	or	histories,	of	the	climate	system.		Chaos	theory	teaches	us	that	immeasurably	tiny,	unknowable	differences	in	the	present	state	of	the	weather	rapidly	become	large	differences	in	the	future	state.	This	is	the	reason	that	useful	forecasts	of	the	daily	weather	more	than	a	couple	of	weeks	in	advance	are	not	possible,	and	that	while	the	atmosphere	in	principle	obeys	deterministic	laws,	in	practice	its	behavior	has	a	component	that	is	indistinguishable	from	that	of	a	stochastic,	or	random	system.	It	also	means	that	the	actual	weather	state,	and	in	fact	the	entire	temporal	sequence	of	weather,	in	a	sense	is	–	within	bounds	set	by	larger	physical	constraints	on	the	climate	–	an	accident,	just	one	possible	history	among	many	equally	possible	ones.	When	talking	about	cause	and	effect	on	long	time	scales,	it	makes	sense	to	focus	on	averages	(or	other	statistics)	over	all	the	equally	likely	weather	states,	to	the	extent	that	we	can	determine	what	these	are.		Yet	if	the	earth’s	climate	history	is	just	one	of	many	equally	possible	histories,	it	is	a	deeply	privileged	one,	scientifically	and	otherwise,	in	that	it	really	did	occur.	No	future	climate	trajectory	is	similarly	privileged.	Thus	there	is	a	fundamental	disconnect	in	time	between	our	knowledge	of	the	climate’s	history,	with	all	its	specificity,	richness	of	detail,	and	undeniable	reality,	and	of	its	future,	about	which	even	a	perfect	prediction	can	only	be	probabilistic	even	in	principle.	In	some	
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respects,	this	disconnect	mirrors	that	between	the	global	scale	–	at	which	we	truly	understand	the	human	influence	on	climate	–	and	the	local	scale,	at	which	its	impacts	are	felt.	Other	uncertainties	in	climate	prediction	are	often	treated	similarly	to	the	aleatoric	one	associated	with	chaos	and	the	unpredictability	of	weather.	Most	important	is	the	epistemic	uncertainty	that	results	from	differences	in	climate	model	constructions.	All	models	are	designed	to	obey	the	laws	of	physics,	but	unavoidable	imperfections	associated	with	expressing	those	laws	on	computers	lead	to	compromises	that	are	made	differently	by	different	groups	of	model-building	scientists.	Not	knowing	which	of	the	resulting	models	is	the	best,	we	generally	consider	them	all	to	be	equally	likely	and	consider	averages,	or	the	whole	distribution	of	different	model	results,	in	order	to	make	predictions	of	the	future.	This	is	yet	another	sense	in	which	climate	science	takes	a	global	view.	Among	other	outcomes,	it	leads	us	to	regard	agreement	between	different	models	as	a	measure	of	confidence,	or	‘robustness.’4		Rather	than	taking	the	scale	of	the	global	–	in	all	three	senses	described	above	–	as	normative,	we	discuss	below	how	this	global	approach	leads	to	conservatism	in	the	attribution	of	specific	weather	and	climate	phenomena	to	human	influence,	and	how	an	approach	that	is	local	in	one	or	more	senses	can	change	this.	By	considering	specific	individual	past,	present	or	future	histories,	rather	than	all	of	them	together,	we	can	at	the	same	time	provide	more	specificity	and	richness	at	the	local	scale	in	space.		This	discussion	has	much	in	common	with	earlier	thinking	in	other	fields	where	one	considers	the	tension	between	individual	case	studies	and	statistical	analyses	that	pool	all	data,	such	as	in	the	study	of	organizational	behavior,5	safety	in	health	care,6	and	public	health.7	The	study	of	specific,	local	narratives	–	though	generally	of	only	the	past,	not	the	future	–	is	also	fundamental	to	humanist	scholarly	fields,	including	history	and	anthropology.	And	to	the	extent	that	consideration	of	the	most	dire	possible	futures	(among	other	specific	ones)	is	used	to	advocate	for	mitigation,	this	view	is	not	new	even	to	the	climate	policy	debate,	but	is	familiar	as	the	‘precautionary	principle’.	Any	novelty	here	comes,	perhaps,	only	from	situating	it	in	the	context	of	the	specific	ways	that	climate	science	articulates	the	causal	links	between	human	greenhouse	gas	emissions	and	their	effects.	With	physics	as	its	disciplinary	model,	climate	science	tends	to	seek	the	most	general	explanations8.	Given	the	constraints	of	chaos	theory	and	model	uncertainty,	this	leads	to	the	global,	statistical	approach	as	normative.	The	limitations	of	that	approach	may	be	particularly	difficult	for	many	climate	scientists	to	see	due	to	their	training,	which	is	strongly	influenced	by	physics,	if	not	explicitly	in	that	discipline	(as	is	true	of	us,	the	authors).	In	all	of	this	our	interest	is	in	introducing	better	ways	for	climate	science	to	address	questions	of	moral	responsibility.	Arbitrary	historical	choices	made	by	scientists,	inherent	to	the	very	practice	of	science,9	encode	specific	human	values.	This	is	as	true	in	climate	science	as	any	other.10	The	specific	choices	made	by	climate	
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scientists	have	consequences	for	the	perception	of	the	overall	message	outside	the	climate	science	community,	and	for	the	resulting	use	of	that	message	in	political	contexts.	We	have	come	to	view	some	of	those	choices	as	misleading	and	ethically	questionable.	We	present	here	some	newer	methodologies	that	we	argue	are	equally	scientifically	defensible	to	the	traditional	ones	but	designed,	consciously,	to	incorporate	local	information	and	concerns.	
2.	Prediction	Scientific	statements	about	climate	change	are	normally	expressed	in	the	form	“climate	change	is	responsible	for	this”,	or	“climate	change	will	lead	to	that”.	Such	statements	can	be	regarded	as	scientific	hypotheses	that	are	either	accepted	or	rejected	by	testing	against	the	evidence	available	at	the	time.	In	hypothesis	testing,	there	are	two	kinds	of	errors	that	can	be	made.	‘Type	1’	errors	are	false	positives,	or	false	alarms:	a	hypothesis	is	accepted	that	later	turns	out	to	be	false.	‘Type	2’	errors	are	false	negatives,	or	missed	warnings:	a	hypothesis	is	rejected	that	later	turns	out	to	be	true.	(The	other	possibilities	are	true	positives,	and	true	negatives.)	In	climate	science,	the	tradition	has	been	to	guard	against	Type	1	errors11.	This	is	exemplified	by	the	detection-attribution	framework12	that	forms	the	centerpiece	of	the	assessments	provided	by	Working	Group	I	–	the	one	focused	most	exclusively	on	physical	science	–	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC),	and	is	illustrated	by	Figure	1a	for	globally-averaged	surface	temperature.	First	the	observed	changes	(black	line)	are	detected,	meaning	that	the	likelihood	of	them	arising	by	chance	is	excluded.	Then	the	changes	are	attributed	to	anthropogenic	climate	change,	meaning	that	they	can	only	be	explained	by	including	greenhouse	gases	and	other	anthropogenic	‘forcing’	in	the	simulations	(shading).	Whilst	this	framework	is	appropriate	for	making	unequivocal	statements	about	anthropogenic	climate	change,	at	the	regional	scale	it	generally	leads	to	a	paralysis,	because	the	uncertainties	are	quite	large	at	that	scale.	This	is	especially	the	case	for	precipitation,	as	is	illustrated	by	Figure	1b,	which	shows	model-predicted	changes	in	precipitation	over	the	21st	century	under	a	high-end	climate	change	scenario.	In	many	regions	the	models	do	not	provide	a	consistent	prediction,	with	some	suggesting	an	increase	and	some	a	decrease	in	precipitation.	This	lack	of	model	agreement	precludes	the	attribution	of	observed	changes	to	climate	change	in	these	regions,	where	most	people	live.		When	considering	local	manifestations	of	climate	change,	a	focus	on	avoiding	Type	1	errors	can	thus	lead	to	the	rejection	of	climate-change	hypotheses.	This	raises	the	prospect	of	committing	Type	2	errors.13	Guarding	against	Type	2	errors	has	been	controversial	within	climate	science,	perhaps	because	it	can	be	construed	as	‘alarmism.’14	Yet	it	is	quite	accepted	in	other	fields	of	applied	science.	For	example,	with	extreme	weather	warnings	a	balance	is	struck,	and	generally	the	public	is	more	tolerant	of	Type	1	errors	than	of	Type	2	errors.	In	drug	testing,	tests	concerning	the	efficacy	of	the	drug	guard	against	Type	1	errors,	whilst	tests	concerning	the	possibility	of	adverse	side	effects	guard	against	Type	2	errors.	Thus,	the	balance	of	
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concern	between	avoiding	Type	1	and	Type	2	errors	depends	very	much	on	the	context;	there	is	no	purely	scientific	basis	for	choosing	one	over	the	other.15		It	follows	that	the	decision	on	how	to	frame	climate	information,	and	the	balance	between	guarding	against	Type	1	and	Type	2	errors,	has	ethical	implications.	There	is	no	such	thing	as	value-free	climate	science16.	In	the	IPCC	detection-attribution	framework,	it	is	stated	that	data	for	scientific	analysis	should	not	be	preselected	based	on	observed	effects,	in	order	to	avoid	selection	bias.17	This	implies	that	the	questions	about	climate	change	must	be	driven	by	the	scientists,	rather	than	by	those	affected	by	climate	change.	It	thereby	represents	a	form	of	what	the	philosopher	Miranda	Fricker	has	called	‘hermeneutic	injustice.’18	Similarly,	the	stated	need	to	remove	the	influence	of	non-climatic	factors	—	referred	to	by	statisticians	as	‘confounding	factors’	—	in	order	to	isolate	the	pure	climate	signal19	makes	it	extremely	difficult	to	detect	and	attribute	climate-change	impacts	involving	non-climatic	human	factors	that	increase	the	vulnerability,	e.g.	in	urban	flooding	or	the	urban	heat-island	effect.	Yet	these	tend	to	represent	the	most	dangerous	climate-change	impacts	on	humanity.		In	order	to	address	risk	and	thereby	guard	against	Type	2	errors,	Working	Group	II	of	the	IPCC,	which	deals	with	impacts	and	adaptation,	defines	climate	change	as	any	observed	change,	not	necessarily	one	attributed	to	anthropogenic	causes.20	This	approach	introduces	a	knowledge	gap	between	Working	Groups	I	and	II,	but	is	the	only	way	to	avoid	the	paralysis	that	would	otherwise	result	for	WGII21.	Climate	change	at	the	local	scale	has	the	challenge	that	the	evidence	base	is	often	legitimately	contestable.	Observational	records	are	limited,	and	in	any	case	do	not	always	relate	directly	to	anthropogenic	climate	change	because	of	many	confounding	factors.	The	usual	experimental	test	in	science,	using	a	controlled	intervention,	is	not	possible	(as	it	is	not,	in	general,	in	any	of	the	earth	sciences).	Climate	models,	based	on	the	governing	physical	equations,	can	be	used	for	this	purpose	(as	in	Figure	1a),	but	they	are	not	the	real	system,	and	can	be	wrong,	particularly	at	local	scales.	Together	this	means	that	the	likelihood	of	high-impact	climate	outcomes	cannot	be	reliably	quantified	in	a	probabilistic	manner,	though	this	by	no	means	implies	that	such	outcomes	are	impossible	or	even	improbable.	Alternative	ways	need	to	be	found	to	respond	to	local	concerns	and	recognize	anthropogenic	climate	change	at	the	local	scale	without	compromising	scientific	rigor.		
3.	Uncertainty	The	limitations	of	scientific	information	are	usually	expressed	in	terms	of	uncertainties.	There	are	three	generic	sources	of	uncertainty	in	how	climate	will	change:22	the	future	evolution	of	climate	forcing	(both	natural	and	anthropogenic,	the	latter	being	dominated	by	increases	in	greenhouse	gases),	the	response	of	the	climate	system	to	that	forcing,	and	internal	variability.	The	uncertainty	in	anthropogenic	climate	forcing	is	mainly	social,	political	and	economic.	Response	uncertainty	is	epistemic	and	is	sometimes	called	‘model	uncertainty’.	Internal	
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variability	–	that	is,	natural	fluctuations	in	climate	that	would	occur	in	the	absence	of	human	influence,	and	still	do	in	its	presence	–	reflects	the	chaotic	nature	of	the	climate	system,	and	is	mainly	aleatoric	rather	than	epistemic	(although	the	statistics	of	extreme	behavior	may	be	quite	uncertain,	and	internal	variability	can	itself	change	with	climate	change).	The	relative	importance	of	these	three	sources	of	uncertainty	varies	with	spatial	and	temporal	scale,	and	with	climate	variable.23	Consideration	of	the	human	impacts	of	climate	change	adds	yet	another	layer	of	uncertainty,	moreover	one	associated	with	different	forms	of	knowledge,	because	vulnerability	and	exposure	depend	on	social	and	political	factors.	It	is	instructive	to	consider	the	chain	of	causal	factors	leading	to	a	particular	climate	risk,	such	as	health	impacts	from	heat	waves	(Figure	2).	The	traditional,	‘scenario-driven’	approach,	as	exemplified	in	Figure	1,	is	to	start	from	the	climate	forcing	scenario	and	predict	the	consequences,	considering	all	possibilities.	But	this	ignores	the	different	kinds	of	uncertainty	involved,	and	thereby	leads	to	a	blurred	picture24.	There	are	alternative	approaches,	which	involve	what	statisticians	call	‘conditioning’	on	the	different	causal	elements	depicted	in	Figure	2,	and	thereby	amount	to	a	degree	of	localization	within	the	space	of	possibilities.	For	example,	it	is	recognized	that	future	exposure	and	vulnerability	–	that	is,	what	human	assets	will	exist	and	how	badly	they	might	be	damaged	by	a	given	level	of	natural	disaster	–	are	related	to	the	same	socio-economic	factors	that	will	determine	future	climate	forcing	(e.g.	a	society	built	on	sustainability	can	be	expected	to	be	less	vulnerable	than	one	characterized	by	regional	rivalries	and	competition	for	resources),	and	this	relationship	can	be	built	into	climate	impact	studies.25		Conditioning	can	also	be	applied	within	the	physical	climate	system.	If	one	wishes	to	know	the	consequences	of	a	given	magnitude	of	global	warming,	which	is	the	sort	of	question	envisaged	by	the	Paris	Agreement,	then	the	longstanding	epistemic	uncertainty	in	climate	sensitivity	–	i.e.	how	much	the	climate	system	warms	for	a	given	increase	in	CO2	–	is	irrelevant.	(Instead	it	affects	the	carbon	budget	that	will	result	in	that	global	warming	magnitude.)	If	one	further	wishes	to	know	the	increase	in	severity	of	a	historical	heat	wave	in	a	warmer	world,	one	may	condition	on	the	occurrence	of	the	specific	atmospheric	circulation	pattern	leading	to	the	heat	wave,	which	–	at	the	cost	that	one	can	no	longer	assign	a	probability	to	the	event’s	occurrence	–	removes	the	major	epistemic	uncertainty	associated	with	changes	in	extreme	weather	events.26	Finally,	from	the	IPCC	WGII	perspective,	one	can	condition	on	the	heat	wave	itself	and	assess	the	impacts	of	different	adaptation	options	affecting	exposure	and	vulnerability	at	the	local	scale,	e.g.	greening	of	an	urban	landscape,	siting	of	senior-citizens	homes,	or	changes	in	building	codes.		The	causal	network	depicted	in	Figure	2	thus	provides	a	conceptual	framework	for	finessing	the	uncertainty	challenge:	each	of	the	conditionings	represents	a	plausible	storyline	of	climate	change27.	In	analogy	to	the	stress	tests	used	in	finance,	the	question	is	changed	from	“What	will	happen?”	to	“If	X	happens,	what	will	be	the	consequences?”.	Appropriately	chosen	numerical	models	can	be	used	to	perform	credible	counter-factual	‘what	if’	or	intervention	experiments,	after	such	
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conditioning,	allowing	hard	numbers	to	be	placed	on	the	results.	In	this	way,	information	that	is	local	–	about	a	specific	place,	or	a	historical	event,	or	a	particularly	worrisome	model	prediction	–	can	be	given	meaning28.		This	avoids	the	blurring,	and	loss	of	information,	that	is	inevitable	when	inhomogeneous	data	are	pooled29.	Local	knowledge	from	historical	events	can	also	be	meaningfully	interpreted	within	such	a	framework,	which	helps	address	hermeneutic	injustice	by	empowering	citizen	science30	and	making	climate	change	‘visible.’31		It	is	possible	to	learn	about	future	climate	risk	from	a	handful	of	events,	or	even	from	single	events32,	though	from	a	statistical	perspective	such	a	statement	seems	non-sensical.	This	is	illustrated	by	Figure	3,	which	shows	the	heat	island	effect	in	southern	Holland	based	on	three	nights	of	data.	In	order	to	discuss	climate	effects	in	this	event,	there	is	not	only	the	issue	of	downscaling	from	the	typical	climate	scale,	but	also	the	influence	of	the	urban	environment	itself,	through	this	heat	island	effect.	From	a	climate	science	perspective,	the	latter	is	a	confounding	factor;	but	from	an	impacts	perspective,	it	is	the	heart	of	the	issue.	Figure	3	shows	how	the	urban	environment	increases	nighttime	temperatures.	It	is	currently	not	possible	to	predict	with	any	reliability	the	future	likelihood	of	heat	waves	at	such	a	local	scale	in	an	unconditional	manner.	However	there	is	clearly	information	contained	in	Figure	3,	most	notably	the	fact	that	certain	neighborhoods,	which	are	often	the	poorest	neighbourhoods,	experience	the	highest	temperatures.	The	reasons	for	this	are	generally	very	clear,	e.g.	less	green	space,	denser	construction,	and	more	dark	surfaces33.	From	this	conditional	perspective,	one	may	infer	that	those	neighborhoods	are	most	at	risk	from	the	increasing	heat	waves	expected	from	climate	change.	This	is	robust,	actionable	information.	
4.	The	global	south	As	we	consider	the	local	vs.	the	global	and	at	the	same	time	the	intersection	of	climate	science	with	ethical	and	political	questions,	it	behooves	us	to	consider	one	major	divide	that	is	present	in	both	the	climate	itself	and	our	global	human	society,	namely	that	between	global	south	and	north	–	or	from	a	climate	science	point	of	view,	between	tropics	and	extratropics.	The	most	glaring	fact	of	global	ethics	when	we	consider	climate	change	is	that	most	of	the	emissions	have	come	from	the	rich,	developed,	extratropical	countries,	whilst	the	most	severe	impacts	will	be	felt	in	poor	tropical	countries.	This	is	true	but	already	widely	understood.	We	focus	here	on	issues	that	may	be	less	so.	In	particular,	the	tropics	is	where	the	normative	approach	to	climate	prediction	and	uncertainty	is	most	clearly	found	to	be	wanting.	This	adds	a	layer	of	hermeneutic	injustice	to	the	ethical	divide	between	global	south	and	north.	The	greater	risk	in	the	tropics	is,	in	part,	simply	a	consequence	of	the	sign	of	the	temperature	change.	As	the	planet	gets	warmer,	the	regions	that	are	already	the	warmest	are	those	where	the	climate	will	first	reach	a	regime	not	historically	seen	anywhere	on	the	planet.		
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Another	difference	results	from	the	different	nature	of	climate	variability	in	the	tropics	vs.	extratropics.	In	climate	predictions,	the	‘time	of	emergence’	is	loosely	defined	as	the	time	at	which	the	long-term	anthropogenic	change	will	be	sufficiently	large	as	to	put	some	aspect	of	the	climate	state	definitively	outside	its	historical	range,	where	that	range	is	assumed	to	be	determined	by	internal	variability.	Figure	4	shows	that,	for	temperature,	this	will	occur	soonest	in	the	tropics.	Whilst	the	magnitude	of	the	change	is	largest	at	high	latitudes,	the	variability	–	both	the	seasonal	cycle	and	year-to-year	fluctuations	–	are	as	well,	and	to	an	even	greater	extent,	such	that	it	is	in	the	tropics	that	temperature	will	first	regularly	exceed	its	historical	range.	On	the	other	hand,	precipitation	is	also	a	crucial	aspect	of	climate.	Here	the	difference	between	tropics	and	extratropics	lies	in	the	poorer	understanding	of	the	expected	precipitation	changes	–	at	least	over	land,	which	is	where	people	live	–	in	the	tropics.	Figure	1b	illustrates	this;	over	land	the	stippling,	indicating	agreement	between	models	(a	proxy,	though	an	imperfect	one,	for	our	degree	of	understanding	or	confidence,	since	a	greater	degree	of	model	agreement	suggests	a	smaller	epistemic	uncertainty),	is	for	the	most	part	confined	to	the	higher	latitudes.	Thus	whilst	we	know	that	precipitation-related	risks	are	greatest	in	the	tropics,	the	potential	for	paralysis	due	to	uncertainty	–	if	one	insists	on	preferentially	guarding	against	Type	1	errors,	as	described	above	–	is	more	pronounced	in	the	tropics.		There	are	scientific	factors	that	make	tropical	precipitation	inherently	challenging	to	predict.	The	tropical	atmosphere	is	warmer	and	moister,	and	deep	convection	–	cloud	systems	that	produce	heavy	rain	–	is	a	more	important	factor	than	in	the	extratropics.	The	essential	physical	processes	of	deep	convection	act	on	relatively	small	space	and	time	scales,	and	thus	must	be	‘parameterized’	in	weather	and	climate	models,	meaning	represented	in	ways	that	are	partly	empirical	and	not	as	tightly	connected	to	the	underlying	laws	of	physics	as	the	larger-scale	processes	are.	Although	there	have	been	gradual	advances	over	time	on	the	convective	parameterization	problem,	it	remains	a	major	weakness	in	current	models.	Short-term	climate	variations	represent	an	exception	to	this	situation;	here	the	understanding	and	predictive	capacity	is	greater	in	the	tropics.	This	is	mainly	because	of	the	highly	predictable	El	Niño–Southern	Oscillation	(ENSO)	phenomenon,	which	occurs	in	the	ocean	and	atmosphere	of	the	equatorial	Pacific,	but	strongly	influences	weather	throughout	the	tropics	and	provides	predictability	on	the	time	scale	of	months.	At	present,	in	fact,	whilst	weather	forecast	models	predict	precipitation	more	accurately	at	higher	latitudes	than	in	the	tropics	for	the	first	few	days,	tropical	predictions	actually	become	more	accurate	at	longer	lead	and	averaging	times	–	where	‘longer’	is	as	short	as	a	week	–	and	this	appears	to	be	at	least	in	part	because	the	ENSO	signal	begins	to	emerge	that	soon.34		Unfortunately	this	advantage	does	not	translate	to	anthropogenic	climate	change.	Most	models	predict	that	the	average	climate	of	the	tropical	Pacific	will	shift	with	warming	to	a	state	similar	to	an	ENSO	warm	event.	Whether	this	prediction	is	correct	remains	contentious,	however.	Analysis	of	the	model	physics	on	its	own	
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suggests	the	possibility	that	the	model	prediction	could	be	wrong;35	moreover	the	trend	in	observations	in	recent	decades	is	in	the	opposite	direction,	towards	a	cold	ENSO-like	state.	The	tropics	is	also	the	region	most	susceptible	to	tropical	cyclones	(also	known	as	hurricanes,	typhoons,	and	by	other	names).	Tropical	cyclones	can	cause	enormous	damage,	with	substantial	long-term	detrimental	effects	on	economic	growth	in	countries	where	they	are	endemic.36	Global	warming	increases	the	risks	from	tropical	cyclones	in	several	ways:	by	increasing	the	precipitation	they	produce;	by	making	their	winds	stronger,	so	that	the	future	will	likely	see	storms	more	powerful	than	any	in	the	past;	and	by	raising	sea	level,	thus	exacerbating	coastal	flooding	from	storm	surge.	How	climate	change	will	affect	the	number	of	storms,	however,	remains	uncertain;	we	do	not	know	whether	storm	frequency	will	increase	or	decrease,	due	to	a	lack	of	agreement	between	models	and,	even	more	importantly,	a	lack	of	physical	understanding.37	The	frequency	of	the	most	severe	events	–	think	of	Typhoon	Haiyan	(2013)	in	the	Philippines,	or	Hurricane	Maria	(2017)	in	Puerto	Rico	–	is	likely	to	increase	regardless,	as	overall	increases	in	storm	intensities	make	intense	storms	relatively	more	common	compared	to	weak	ones,	but	that	prediction	is	not	certain,	particularly	in	any	specific	region.	Regions	of	storm	formation	and	intensification	are	likely	to	undergo	some	changes,	increasing	hazard	dramatically	in	some	regions	while	reducing	it	in	others.		Some	of	these	changes	in	tropical	cyclone	activity	may	already	be	evident;	for	example,	an	increase	in	tropical	cyclone	activity	in	the	Arabian	Sea	–	where	cyclones	are	historically	quite	rare	–	is	robustly	predicted	by	climate	models,	and	is	arguably	already	being	observed,38	increasing	hazard	in	the	Middle	Eastern,	East	African	and	South	Asian	nations	around	it.	And	beyond	climate	change	–	and	perhaps	even	more	important	–	continued	urbanization	increases	the	population	at	risk	in	many	of	the	coastal	cities	most	exposed	to	tropical	cyclones.	When	all	these	factors	are	considered,	the	risks	of	tropical	cyclone	impacts	are	almost	certainly	increasing.	Yet	the	specifics	are	quite	uncertain	–	especially	due	to	the	uncertainty	around	storm	frequency	–	and	even	that	uncertainty	is	difficult	to	quantify,	since	most	of	it	is	epistemic	in	origin.	This	is	precisely	the	sort	of	situation	in	which	storyline	approaches	are	needed.	Ghosh	imagines	the	nightmarish	possibility	of	a	major	cyclone	landfall	in	Mumbai,	India,	a	city	that	appears	unprepared	for	it,	and	exceedingly	vulnerable.	A	subsequent	scientific	research	study	shows	this	specific	storyline	to	be	plausible,	even	though	it	is	without	precedent	in	the	city’s	modern	history39.	
5.	Epilogue	Although	the	driving	force	of	climate	change	is	global,	climate	change	is	being	and	will	be	experienced	at	the	local	scale	and	in	extreme	events,	in	ways	that	are	both	specific	to	the	nature	of	those	places	and	the	accident	of	the	weather	history	particular	to	that	place	and	period.	In	other	words,	climate	change	is	experienced,	and	will	be	experienced,	through	storylines	rather	than	through	the	global	(and	mostly	unrealized)	probabilities	that	are	normative	in	climate	science.	An	over-
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reliance	on	probabilities	dulls	the	edges,	removes	the	human	context,	and	inhibits	us	from	facing	the	full	reality	of	our	climate	future.	We	argue	here	for	a	more	local	perspective	(in	multiple	senses);	for	an	elevation	of	the	narrative;	and	for	a	demotion	of	the	probabilistic	from	its	place	of	privilege	in	the	construction	and	communication	of	our	understanding	of	global	warming	and	its	local	consequences.		
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Figure	1.	(a)	Change	in	globally	averaged	surface	temperature	over	the	20th	century.	Observations	are	shown	with	the	black	line,	and	the	range	of	climate	model	simulations	with	and	without	anthropogenic	climate	change	with	the	pink	and	purple	shading,	respectively.	(b)	Predicted	changes	in	precipitation	(in	%)	over	the	21st	century	under	a	high	climate	forcing	scenario	(RCP8.5).	Stippling	indicates	where	the	model	predictions	are	robust,	in	the	sense	of	agreeing	on	the	sign	of	the	change;	otherwise	the	models	do	not	agree.	Hatching	indicates	where	the	average	model	changes	are	small	compared	with	internal	variability,	but	this	does	not	mean	that	individual	model	changes	are	small.	Both	figures	are	from	Stocker	et	al.	(2014).	
	
Figure	2.	Schematic	of	a	causal	network	depicting	climate-related	health	impacts	from	a	heat	wave	in	a	particular	city.	This	factorizes	the	uncertainty.	See	text	for	details.	Adapted	from	Shepherd	(2019).	
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Figure	3.	Surface	temperature	differences	in	the	province	of	South	Holland,	using	Landsat	8	images,	averaged	over	the	nights	of	12/13	September	2016,	26/27	May	2017	and	18/19	June	2017.	Each	colour	step	represents	an	increment	of	1°C,	with	red	colours	indicating	higher	temperatures.	The	nocturnal	temperatures	are	a	good	indicator	of	the	heat	island	effect,	which	is	very	evident	in	the	cities:	Rotterdam	is	at	the	bottom	of	the	image,	and	The	Hague	to	the	upper	left.	From	van	der	Hoeven	and	Wandl	(2017).		
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Figure	4.	Predicted	number	of	months	per	year	in	2051–2100	that	will	exceed	the	maximum	absolute	temperature	found	across	all	months	from	1951–2000,	under	a	high	climate	forcing	scenario	(RCP8.5).	From	Harrington	et	al.	(2017).	
